Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

2-6-1953

Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co.
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co. [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 326.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/326

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

192

ATKINSON v. PACIFIC FIRE ExTINGUISHER Co.

[40 C.2d

p<'mtlty." I find no di:-;tiugni:-;hing feature:;;. It appears to
lllP 1lwt tlw $fi0 provision here might just as well be held to
lw a penalty in th1: pvent of non perfm·maJlf~l:' by the defendant,
and that it <~ertainly bears no reasonable relation to the 1m;ses
which the parties had in contemplation.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial
<~ourt to rPtry the ease and submit the issue of damages to
1he jnry.

[S. I<'. No. 18603.

In Bank.

Feb. 6, 1953.]

HAI_j lVI. A'l'KINSON et al., Respondents, v. PACIFIC FIRE
EX'l'INGUISHER COMPANY, Appellant.
[1] Contracts-Performance-Waiver of Breach.-Where contract
by which defendant company installed fire detection system
in plaintiffs' planing mill provides for an annual rental payable in monthly installments, defendant's acceptance of overdue payments constitutes a waiver of strict compliance by
plaintiffs.
[2a, 2b] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of Validity of Stipulation.-Provision in contract that
in case of failure of fire detection system installed by defendant company in plaintiffs' planing mill to perform detection
service and a resulting loss the company's liability shall be limited to $25 as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, is
a valid provision for liquidated damages where the parties
had no way of knowing what type of fire might occur after
a particular failure of the detection system and could not
have predicted what portion of the foss in any particular
fire would be the proximate result of failure of such system,
and where the uncertain extent to which losses might occur,
viewed from the time of entering into the contract, would
make the task of fixing damages an extremely difficult if not
an impossible one.
[3] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provision.-One who relies on a clause for liquidated damages in a
contract must show that the parties to the contract "agree
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the
amount of damages sustained by a breach thereof." (Civ.
Code, § 1671.)
[3] See Oal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 248; [2, 6] Damages,
§ 126; [3, 4] Damages, § 117; [5] Damages, § 120.
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[4] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provision.-The amount agreed on in a clause for liquidated damages must result from a reasonable endeavor by the parties
to estimate a fair compensation for any loss that may be
sustained because of a breach.
[5] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Construction of Stipulation.-An agreement that on failure of a fire detection
system installed by defendant company in plaintiffs' planing
mill to function properly and a resulting loss such company
shall pay $25 as liquidated damages is valid where, in view
of the fact that neither party could foresee what the consequences of a breach might be, the damages might be greater
or less than the amount agreed on, and the agreement is not
one providing for a penalty wherein the amount agreed on
bears no reasonable relation to the losses the parties considered might be sustained.
[6] Id.- Liquidated Damages and Penalties- Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-While a stipulation by parties to
a contract that they agreed on an amount "as liquidated
damages, and not as a penalty" is not conclusive, it is entitl~d to some weight.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. S. Victor ~Wagler, Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Action for damages for breach of contract. Modified and
affirmed.
Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley and Charles A. Beardsley
for Appellant.
Clark & Heafey, Thornton & Taylor and Augustin Donovan for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict for $97,437 in favor of the plaintiffs in an action for
breach of contract. 'l'he questions presented are the effect
of a prior default by the plaintiffs and the validity of a clause
in a written contract fixing liquidated damages for breach of
the contract.
On June 5, 1939, plaintiffs entered into a written "lease"
agreement with the defendant company whereby the defendant
agreed to install, maintain and operate a fire detection system in the plaintiffs' planing mill located in Oakland. The
40 C.2d-7
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system was designed to detect fires originating on the plaintiffs' premises and to automatically transmit signals to the
Municipal :B1 ire Alarm System of the City of Oakland. The
term of the lease was 10 years, at an annual rental of $180
payable in monthly installments of $15 each. Paragraph 6
provides that in the event of default in payments, the defendant had the right to enter and remove the detection
system. Paragraph 11 provides, "It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Lessor is not an insurer,
and that the payments hereinbefore named are based solely
on the value of the services in the operation of the system described, and in case of failure to perform such service and a
resulting loss its liability hereunder shall be limited to and
fixed at the sum of Twenty-five dollars as liquidated damages,
and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive.''
On July 8, 1948, while the system supposedly remained
in operation, a fire was discovered in the plaintiffs' mill. The
defendant does not contest the implied finding of the jury
that the detection system failed to operate. The :first alarm
to the fire department was manually transmitted by one of the
plaintiffs' employees, and there is evidence that fire fighting
equipment arrived on the scene within two minutes after the
alarm. Nevertheless the :fire was then out of control and
the planing mill was destroyed.
[1] At the time of the :fire the plaintiffs were in default
in the payment of the monthly rental installments for June
and July of 1948. During the trial the plaintiffs tendered and
the defendant accepted these payments. There was evidence
received without objection that throughout the period of the
lease the plaintiffs' payments were occasionally in arrears.
During most of 1946 payments were made a month or more
after becoming due. On these occasions the defendant did
not remove the detection system or discontinue the service nor
was there any demand for strict compliance. Time had not
been made of the essence of the contract. It was customary
for the plaintiffs to pay the rental charges upon receipt of an
invoice each month, and although controverted there was
evidence that invoices were not received for June and July.
'l1 he record furnishes substantial grounds for the application
of the principle that where an obligee condones delay in
periodic performance strict compliance thereafter is waived.
(Boone v. Templeman (1910), 158 Cal. 290 [110 P. 947. 139
Am.St. Rep. 126] ; Kern Stmset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co.
(1931), 214 Cal. 435 [6 P.2d 71, 80 A.L.R. 453].)
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In view of the conclusion on the second phase of the case
concerning liquidated damages it is unnecessary to discuss
other points made by the defendant as to the form of the
pleadings and the evidence with reference to the question of
waiver. It is enough to say that the implied findings of the
jury to the effect that the defendant's acceptance of overdue
payments constituted a waiver of strict performance is supported by substantial evidence.
The principal contention of the defendant is that paragraph 11 of the contract is a valid provision for liquidated
damages. This is the second phase of the case and the facts
with reference thereto are undisputed. Civil Code, section
1670, states that a provision in a contract which provides
for the amount of damages to be paid in the event of a subsequent breach of the contract is void, except as expressly
provided in section 1671 as follows: "The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage."
In the case of Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American District
Tel. Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], this day decided,
it was held that the question whether it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix liquidated damages is generally
a question of fact and that the time for the determination of
the question is the time of making the contract. It was also
held in that case that the question becomes one of law where
the facts are not in dispute and admit of but one conclusion.
[2a] In the present case the defendant claims that as a
matter of law the jury could not properly have found that it
was not impracticable or extremely difficult to fix actual
damages when viewed from the position of the contracting
parties under all the circumstances of the case existing at the
time the contract was executed. The defendant points out that
the detection system was intended to provide protection in
case of a wide variety of fires. Some of them would be
slow burning, as in a bed of sawdust, where a loss resulting
from the failure of the detection system might be negligible.
Other fires might result only in a pitted floor. Still others
would immediately envelop the buildings in flames and result
in a very substantial loss. Looking ahead the parties had no
way of knowing what type of fire might occur after a particular failure of the detection system. The merit in the
defendant's contention lies in the argument that in no event

196

ATKINSON v. PACIFIC FIRE ExTINGUISHER Co.

[ 40 C.2d

could the parties have predicted what portion of the loss
in any particular fire would be the proximate result of the
failure of the detection system. It is true that in the event
the detection system was functioning properly, there would
probably be some damage by fire prior to the alarm; that
further damage would have occurred before the fire fighting
equipment could have been put into operation; and that the
fire may have been of such a nature that the planing mill would
have been consumed. 'l'he uncertain extent to which losses
might occur viewed from the time of entering into the contract would make the task of fixing damages an extremely
difficult if not an impossible one. There were additional
factors to be considered, such as the weather conditions at
the time of the fire, the season of the year, the success of the
municipal fire fighting department in moving through traffic
to the scene of the fire, and the presence of a full crew of employees or of only a night watchman on the premises. The
factors involved were too many and too variable to permit of
any certainty in predicting the extent of the losses directly
attributable to the failure of the detection system with reference to a particular fire.
The liquidation clause here in question is in effect the same
as that appearing in the contract considered in the companion
case of Better Food Markets, Inc., v. American District Tel.
Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], above referred to. There
the parties contracted for the installation and operation of a
burglar alarm system which failed to operate. A substantial
loss occurred. It was held, as here, that under the undisputed
facts it was competent for the parties, at the time the contract
was executed, to agree that it was impracticable or extremely
difficult to fix in advance the actual damages that might result from a breach of the contract.
It is true that the validity of a clause for liquidated damages may be questioned on other grounds. [3] One who
relies upon a liquidation clause must show that the parties
to the contract" agree therein upon an amount which shall be
presumed to be the amount of damages sustained by a breach
thereof . . . " ( Civ. Code, § 1671.) [ 4] As held in the
Better Food Markets, Inc. case the amount agreed upon must
result from a reasonable endeavor by the parties to estimate
a fair compensation fbr any loss that may be sustained because of a breach. [2b] In the present case the defendant,
for a compensation of $15 a month agreed to sound an early
warning in case of fire; also to inspect and test the detection
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system, anu to maintain the equipment which was a part
thereof. It was agreed that the payments were based "solely
on the value of the services in the operation of the system"
and that in the event of a failure of the defendant "to perform such services and a resulting loss.'' its liability was to
be fixed at $25 as liquidated damages. It is to be noted that
the contract does not limit the defendant's liability to losses
resulting from fire, but rather to losses resulting from the
defendant's failure to perform the contracted-for services,
which services included inspecting, testing and maintaining
the equipment as well as early warning in the event of a fire.
These supplementary services were recognized in the contract
to have value in themselves. They also included advantageous
fire insurance rates where a detection system was kept in
operation. A breach of contract by the defendant, then,
might result in losses to the plaintiff other than fire losses,
such as the cost to the plaintiff of maintaining the system
where the defendant had failed to do so. From the standpoint of the defendant it was important that it should know
the extent of its liability. From the small compensation received obviously it could not afford to assume responsibilities
such as are assumed in the case of fire insurance coverage.
On the other hand, while the plaintiffs could not and did not
expect the defendant to furnish the security which fire insurance would afford, they were entitled to some compensation
for the defendant's breach of contract although they had no
way of knowing either the nature or the extent of a loss
which might result after the defendant's breach. In view of
the fact that neither party could foresee what the consequences
of a breach would be, it was entirely reasonable for them to
agree upon the stated amount which by the statute is then
presumed to be the damages sustained because of a breach.
'rhese damages, as stated, might be greater or less than the
amount agreed upon. The greater the difficulty encountered
by the parties in estimating the damages, the greater should
be the range of estimates which the courts should uphold as
reasonable. ( 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1059, p. 291.)
[5] To hold that the parties have not entered into a valid
contract for liquidated damages, it would be necessary to construe the agreement as one for a penalty wherein the amount
agreed upon bore no reasonable relation to the losses the
parties considered might be sustained. This cannot be said to
be true in this case. [6] The parties did stipulate that
they agreed upon an amount ''as liquidated damages, and not
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as a penalty.'' \Vhile not conclusive, such a stipulation is
entitled to some weight. (Stark v. Shemada, 187 Cal.. 785,
788 [204 P. 214]; Restatement of Contracts,§ 339(f), p. 544.)
'l'he view here taken of the effect of paragraph 11 of the
contract makes it unnecessary to consider arguments by the
defendant wherein it attempts to uphold the validity of paragraph 11 as a provision for limited liability. The language
employed is clear and unambiguous and does not attempt to
limit damages but rather to provide a fixed amount in the
event of a breach, whether the actual damages should be
greater or less than that amount. Under all of the facts
and circumstances of the case the provision is a valid clause
for liquidated damages as authorized by statute.
The judgment of the trial court is modified by reducing
the same to the sum of $25 without costs'. As so modified
the judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear its own
costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Paragraph 11 of the agreement between plaintiffs and defendant company provided that "It is agreed by and between
the parties hereto that the Lessor is not an insurer, and that
the payments hereinbefore named are based solely on the
value of the services in the operation of the system described,
and in case of failure to perform such service and a resulting
loss its liability hereunder shall be lirnited to and fixed at the
surn of 'fwenty-five dollars as liquidated damages, and not as
a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive." (Emphasis
added.) 'l'his provision is held by the majority of this court
to constitute a valid and enforceable provision for liquidated
damages.
Section 1670 of the Civil Code provides that a provision in
a contract which provides for the amount of damages to be
paid in the event of a subsequent breach of the contract is
void, except as expressly provided in section 1671. Section
1671 provides that ''The parties to a contract may agree
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the
amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from
the nature of the case, it would be irnpracticable or extrernely
difficult to fix the actual darnage." (Emphasis added.)
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It is conceded in Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American
District Tel. Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], this day
filed, that the question as to whether it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix liquidated damages is generally
(see my dissent in that case) a question of fact. The jury
here made that determination adversely to defendants, but
this court has reversed that determination and decided, for
itself, the question of fact and, in so doing, has once again
usurped the function of the jury. This is another of the
growing list of cases where a fact question has been decided
by the trial court on demurrer, by a jury, again by the trial
court on a motion for a new trial, and by the District Court
of Appeal which affirmed the judgment (Cal.App.) 240 P.2d
651 and this court reverses. This practice-that of reversing
findings of fact, and implied findings, made on conflicting
evidence by the trial court and the jury-may very well at
some later date be held to violate the constitutional provision
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) which guarantees that "The right
of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate;
" (See, also, 23 So. Cal.L.Rev., pp. 334-343.)
The person seeking enforcement of a liquidated damage
clause has the burden of establishing that at the time the
contract was entered into the nature of the agreement was such
that it would be extremely impracticable or difficult for a
court (or jury) to fix the actual damage in the event of a
breach (Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138
A.L.R. 589]). It is said that "It is a question of fact in each
instance whether the nature of the case is such that it would
be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." (Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385.) (Emphasis
added.)
It cannot be said with a clear conscience that in the event
of damage by fire, it would be impracticable or extremely
difficult to fix the amount of damages which might be suffered.
It happens every day. Appraisers estimate the amount of
damage which could be done by fire, or theft, to whatever type
of business or residence is involved. Hence, it could easily
have been ascertained how damages were to be computed in
the event a fire occurred. It could have been computed what
the damages would be in the event the fire occurred in the
planing mill, in the stacks of lumber, in the office, the sawdust piles, or any other part of plaintiffs' property. There is a
going price for lumber, repairs, etc. at any time of the year.
In the Schmid case, supra, the price of flour was involved.
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This court held that a provision for liquidated damages
could not be upheld because actual damages involved could
have been estimated in accordance with established principles.
vV e said there that ''In states like California, which have code
sections governing the matter of liquidated damages, the
courts cannot disregard the plain provision of the statute.''
It is said in the majority opinion that "It is to be noted
that the contract does not limit the defendant's liability to
losses resulting from fire, but rather to losses resulting from
the defendant's failure to perform the contracted-for services,
which services included inspecting, testing and maintaining
the equipment as well as early warning in the event of a fire.''
It is not essential that any such thing be noted. It can
as easily be inferred from the language used that the plaintiffs' purpose in installing the system was only the early
detection of fire so that losses might be minimized. The
agreement provides that the payments (rental) are based
''solely on the value of the services in the operation of the
system described" and that "in case of failure to perform
stteh service and a resulting loss," the defendant's liability
should be limited to $25. (Emphasis added.) It surely is
reasonable to infer from the language used that the only value
of the system was the early detection of a fire; that "resulting
loss'' meant a loss from fire. But the majority concludes
that a breach of this contract might result in a loss, other than
from fire, ''such as the cost to the plaintiff of maintaining the
system where the defendant has failed to do so.'' This statement appears to me to be the height of absurdity. The maintenance of a fire detection system is a matter for experts;
plaintiffs would have no way of knowing whether or not defendant had maintained it in proper working order until a
test, such as a fire, occurred and until precisely the same
results as here occurred.
The so-called liquidated damage provision here was for
$25. This court in the Schmid case said that ''A valid
liquidated damage clause must, of course, rep1·esent a reasonable endeavor by the parties to estimate fair compensation for
the loss sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v.
Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 593 [189 P. 445]; 3 Williston, Contracts ( 1936), p. 2192, sec. 779 ; Restatement of Contracts, sec. 339; 10 Cal.L.Rev. 8, 14.)" (Emphasis added.)
It is said in the majority opinion that "To hold that the parties
have not entered into a valid contract for liquidated damages,
it would be necessary to construe the agreement as one for a
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penalty wherein the amount agreed upon bore no reasonable
relation to the losses the parties eonsidered might be sustained.
'rhis ean not be said to be true in this ease." Upon what possible, rational basis can it be said that the sum of $25 bears
any reasonable relation to any loss which the parties considered might be sustained? Considering the price of lumber
in 1939 (the time the contract was entered into), it might
almost be said as a matter of judicial notice that $25 would
not be reasonable compensation for a bale of shingles! But the
majority, to sustain its unsound position, must strain at
gnats to find a reason why the sum of $25 might bear some
relation to any possible loss! Note: "The defendant points
out that the detection system was intended to provide protection in case of a wide variety of fires. Some of them would
be slow burning, as in a bed of sawdust, where a loss resulting
from the failure of the detection system might be negligible.
Other fires might result only in a pitted floor. Still others
would immediately envelop the buildings in flames and result
in a very substantial loss. Looking ahead the parties had no
way of knowing what type of fire might occur after a particular failure of the detection system." It is then said that
weather conditions, the particular season of the year, and the
traffic, and the number of plaintiffs' employees present would
all have a bearing on the loss sustained. 'rhe evidence showed
that the fire fighting equipment arrived at the premises within two minutes after the alarm had been given manually.
Surely it would not have been difficult to determine in advance, from other fires in the vicinity, the type of service to
be expected from the fire department, and as I have heretofore pointed out, the damage which might be expected from
a fire in a particular part of plaintiffs' business.
The characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears no
relation to the actual damage which may be caused by a
breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to estimate the amount of injury (8 Cal.Jur. 847). "The tendency
and preference of the law is to regard a stated sum as a
penalty, except where the actual damages cannot be ascertained by amy standard." (People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co.,
76 Cal. 29, 36 [18 P. 90] .) (Emphasis added.) Any provision
by which money or property is to be forfeited without regard
to ad nil I damage suffered, calls for a penalty and is therefore void (Fox Chicago R. Corp. v. Zukor's Dresses, Inc.,
50 Cal.App.2d 129 [122 P.2d 705]; Ebbert v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496 [2 P.2d 776] ; Mente & Co. v. Fresno
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C. & W. Co., 113 Cal.App. 325 [298 P. 126] ; White v. City
of San Diego, 126 Cal.App. 501 [14 P.2d 1062]). A provision
for liquidated damages in a contract for the purchase of stock
was held to be void since it was neither impracticable nor
extremely difficult to fix the seller's actual damage for the
purchaser's breach (Porter v. Gibson, 25 Cal.2d 506 [154
P.2d 703] ).
In McCormick on Damages, page 606, et sequitur, it is said
that courts are tending to adopt as the sole test whether the
ammmt named was reasonably proportionate to the probable loss. It is said that "the law's sole purpose in departing
from its usual rule of enforcing agreements, when it declines to enforce agreements for penalties, is to avoid the
extortion and injustice which a free power to stipttlate damages would invite, the proper test of whether a particular
stipulation is a penalty (that is, is unenforceable) is whether,
viewed as of the time of its making, it is reasonably proportioned to the probable loss which will ensue from a breach.''
(Emphasis added.) In Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trttst, 280 U.S.
224, 226 [50 S.Ct. 142, 74 L.Ed. 382], a tenant had stipulated
that, in the event of his bankruptcy, the lessor should be entitled to damages equal to the rent for the balance of the
term. The term was two years and the rent was $4,000 a
year. The tenant became bankrupt fifteen months before the
lease expired, the lessor demanded damages of $5,000 under
the agreement. The Supreme Court said: ''The amount thus
stipulated is so disproportionate to any damage reasonably to
be anticipated in the circumstances disclosed that we must
hold the provision is for an unenforceable penalty." (Emphasis added.)
It is my opinion that the majority opinion is wrong for two
reasons : The damages to be expected could have been ascertained at the time of entering into the contract and cannot
be said, as a matter of law, to be "impracticable or extremely
difficult" to fix; and that it cannot be said that the sum of $25
bears any reasonable proportion to the loss which might be
expected from the failure of the fire detection system to
operate.

I would affirm the judgment.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March
5, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

